Czech, German and US parties on three axes — economic, social and foreign policy — from the 2024 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (609 political scientists) and, for the US, the Global Party Survey 2019. Drag to rotate, scroll to zoom.
| Economic | −10 left | +10 right | lrecon |
|---|---|---|---|
| Social | −10 progressive | +10 conservative | galtan |
| Foreign policy | −10 pro-Western | +10 pro-Russian | eu_russia |
For the two US parties the foreign-policy axis reads
−10 Atlanticist · +10 isolationist, from the Global Party Survey's
V13 (nationalism ↔ multilateralism), inverted to match. It is a close cousin of
eu_russia, not the same question: eu_russia asks specifically about
Russia, V13 about multilateral engagement in general. The two come apart exactly
over the US, where the pre-2016 Republican party was strongly Atlanticist and often
unilateralist at the same time.
#000000
— ΔE 0.0; SPD (DE) #E3000F and the US Republicans #E9141D are
the same red at ΔE 1.7; AfD and CSU differ by ΔE 6.3, ODS and TOP 09 by
ΔE 7.1 — all far below the 15 floor for normal vision. Grüne against SPD (DE) is
ΔE 3.9 under deuteranopia, indistinguishable for roughly 8% of men. No surface or reordering
fixes this without abandoning brand colour, so the axis modes — a validated blue↔red diverging
ramp with a neutral midpoint — are the legible way to read the cloud. Identity is never carried
by colour alone: every point has a hover label, a checkbox, a marker shape for its country, and a
row in the table below.
| Party | Family | Economic | Social | Foreign | EU | Sys. rej. | Exec | Judic | Seats | Vote % | Source |
|---|
(v − 5) × 2.
Economic is lrecon (0 = extreme left, 10 = extreme right).
Social is galtan (0 = libertarian/postmaterialist, 10 =
traditional/authoritarian).
Foreign policy is eu_russia: 0 = "European countries should invest more in
defence and security to defend against Russian aggression", 10 = "…more in trade and diplomacy
with Russia to improve relations". EU integration is eu_position, used for
colour only, not as an axis. The same (v − 5) × 2 rescaling applies to every
dimension on this page — including the two colour-only ones — so no two columns of the table
are ever on different scales, and 0 always means the source survey's midpoint.
executive_power (0 = leaders should be constrained … 10 = should act without
constraint) and judicial_independence (0 = the judiciary should be independent …
10 = the government should have influence over it). For the US it is the Global Party Survey's
V16 (0 = strongly respects liberal-democratic norms … 10 = strongly undermines them).
Both source scales are native 0–10 and are rescaled here to −10…+10 by (v − 5) × 2,
the same transform the three axes use — so every number on this page is on one scale and 0 means
the survey's midpoint. Joined on GPS's ID_CHES crosswalk the two agree across 135 shared parties at
r = 0.823, mean absolute difference 1.19 — looser than the 0.948 for the economic
axis, and some of that gap is five years of real movement rather than instrument disagreement.
galtan, so
roughly half of it is already on screen; the other half is what earns it a place. The residual is
where it gets interesting — CSU, KDU-ČSL and CDU are markedly more system-loyal than their
social conservatism predicts, while BSW has the largest excess rejection of any party here despite
being economically left and socially mid-scale.
CHES_lrecon column, so the two instruments were compared
rather than assumed to agree: across 84 parties both surveys cover, r = 0.948, mean
absolute difference 0.56 on the 0–10 scale (±1.1 here) and no systematic offset. That
agreement is what makes one chart defensible; the square markers are there because it is still
not the same survey.